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Abstract 
 
The paper analyses the extent of and the reasons behind limits to competition policy 
harmonisation in EU enlargement. Our focus is on vertical restraints. First, we 
compare the relevant legal regimes towards vertical agreements in the EU and in 
Eastern Europe. We then describe competition policy practice in all ten EU candidate 
countries and point out differences both between East and West and among the 
candidates. Finally, we examine a large database of inter-firm agreements in Eastern 
Europe’s car industry and use insights from case studies of subcontracting to highlight 
instances of non-conformity between (1) East European competition law and practice 
and (2) EU rules and East European competition law enforcement. The conclusion 
recommends how to improve competition policy practice, and thus compliance, post-
enlargement. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The 1993 Copenhagen European Council specified that candidate countries for EU 
accession must adjust their administrative structures, “so that European Community 
legislation transposed into national legislation is implemented effectively through 
appropriate administrative and judicial structures.” Hence accession depends on 
setting up the rules embodied in the acquis communautaire and on making them 
work. This paper addresses one area of the acquis, namely parts of competition 
policy, where rules and rule enforcement are considerably at odds. Our evidence 
suggests that firms in the candidate countries strike agreements that distort 
competition to a higher extent than acknowledged. This contradicts the guarded 
optimism concerning harmonization expressed by the Commission in its annual 
Progress Reports. 
 
Throughout the accession process the Commission for good measure emphasized 
the importance of market dominance, merger control, and state aid in aligning 
competition policy in the candidate countries with the acquis. Given their history of 
pervasive state ownership especially of large enterprises, soft budget constraints, and 
no market for corporate control, this was clearly warranted. The endeavours of the 
candidate countries in these policy fields are highly visible and lend themselves to 
careful monitoring, including by outside observers such as the Commission. For 
example, corporate takeovers are impossible to keep out of the limelight. And what 
definitions of market dominance the respective competition authority uses, how it 
decides what the relevant markets are, and whether this process is transparent to – and 
open to appeal by – the interested parties is relatively easy to observe. All of this is 
key to judging competition compliance. 
 
By contrast, restrictive agreements among firms, such as vertical restraints, are 
different. In principle, they are illegal. But under certain conditions they need not be, 
for example when they protect certain types of technology transfer. So it is not 
enough for entrepreneurs to be aware of the general prohibition in that they may be 
able exploit one of numerous exemptions. In addition, this area of competition law is 
in flux. Therefore, for the candidate countries rule alignment has been like shooting at 
a moving target. Rule enforcement is even more challenging. Our research suggests 
that not everyone in the business community and certainly not all regulators are 
familiar with the issue at hand. For firms to be in compliance, and for outsiders to 
monitor the enforcement capability and record of the competition authorities, is not a 
simple feat at all. Thus, lack of competition compliance is what this paper is about. It 
adds to the sparse literature covering implementation experience in transition 
countries (cf. Dutz & Vagliasindi, 2000; Fingleton et al., 1996, Chap.9; Hoekman & 
Djankov, 2000). 
 
Section 2 describes the rules governing vertical agreements in EU competition 
law. It also covers the rules pertaining to the relationship between the EU and the 
candidate countries of Eastern Europe. Section 3 characterises similarities and 
differences between EU and East European competition rules. It discusses how the 
Commission interprets competition policy harmonisation and suggests what may be 
wrong with its approach. Section 4 produces evidence of anti-competitive behaviour 
between domestic and foreign firms in East Europe’s emerging automotive sector. 
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Section 5 concludes with recommendations for competition policy practice post-
enlargement. 
 
 
2 The legal regime towards vertical agreements in the EU and in the 
Europe Agreements 
 
In the Europe Agreements, the approximation of competition laws plays an important 
role for the candidate countries’ economic integration into the European Community 
(Van den Bossche, 1997, p. 25). In 1999 the EU changed its legal regime on vertical 
agreements. Traditionally it was primarily legal-form based. The revised version 
makes more use of economic analysis in assessing VRs. Thus the part of the acquis 
that refers to VRs was effectively in flux while the accession negotiations were under 
way. This cannot have made harmonization any easier for the candidate countries.  
 
 
The current EU regime towards vertical agreements with technology transfer 
 
Anti-competitive vertical agreements are referred to as vertical restraints (VRs). They 
are prohibited (Art 81(1) EC) and automatically void (Art. 81(2) EC). However, they 
may qualify for an exemption from the prohibition if their benefits outweigh the 
anticompetitive costs (Art. 81(3) EC). The focus of this study is on inter-firm 
relationships where technology transfer may justify exclusivity in the parties’ dealings 
with each other on efficiency grounds. 
 
Three sets of rules may apply to vertical agreements containing intellectual 
property rights (IPR) clauses: 
 
1. The Commission’s Notice on Subcontracting1: Subcontracting agreements oblige 
the subcontractor to supply goods or services to the contractor (or on his behalf). 
If he for this purpose needs access to the contractor’s technology or equipment, 
the latter may want to protect his assets and restrict how the subcontractor 
employs them. He may forbid that the subcontractor make them available to third 
parties, and require that the subcontractor supply the goods, services or work 
resulting from the use of the assets exclusively to himself. Such restrictions are 
allowed if the assets are necessary for the subcontractor to provide the buyer with 
goods or services that differ from those available on the market. It is also a 
necessary condition that the subcontractor not have easy alternative access to 
similar assets (European Commission, 1978; see also Van Bael & Bellis, 1987, pp. 
207-8). 
 
2. Commission regulation (EC) No. 240/96 on technology transfer2 aims to facilitate 
the dissemination of technology and the improvement of manufacturing processes 
by giving the licensor incentives to license her technology or know-how, and by 
                                                           
1 Commission (1978). The notice represents the Commission’s views on 
subcontracting and is not legally binding. However, the European Court of Justice is 
likely to respect the Notice in the interest of legal certainty insofar as no significant 
opposing considerations take effect (Fejø, 1997, p. 218). 
2 Korah (1996) and Robertson (1996) provide in-depth treatments of this regulation. 
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giving the licensee incentives to invest in complementary assets necessary to 
market new products or to employ new processes. The licensor may restrict the 
use of the license and promise that the licensee will not face intra-brand 
competition in her own territory, including from the licensor herself. She may also 
restrict the licensee’s active or passive sales into other licensees’ territories. White 
clauses cover, inter alia, an obligation on the licensee to restrict her exploitation 
of the licensed technology technically or product-wise. Price fixing, resale price 
maintenance, refusals to deal with parallel traders and other restrictions on 
manufacturing, sales and innovations are blacklisted. 
 
3. Art. 2(3) of the Block Exemption Regulation3: The BER exempts from Art. 81(1) 
vertical agreements provided their market share not exceed 30 per cent of the 
relevant market. Some IPRs fall within the scope of the BER. Article 2(3) 
exempts vertical agreements which transfer IPRs from a supplier to a buyer in 
order to facilitate use, sale or resale of the contract good or service.4 The BER 
complements the Technology Transfer Regulation and the Notice on 
Subcontracting. It does not apply when the IPRs are provided by the buyer to the 
supplier, or in the case of subcontracting involving the transfer of know-how to a 
subcontractor. 
 
 
The Europe Agreements 
 
With a wording copied from Articles 81(1) and 82 of the EC Treaty, the Europe 
Agreements prohibit restrictive agreements and abuse of dominance insofar as they 
affect trade between the EC and the candidate country. Practices are to be assessed on 
the basis of criteria arising from the application of the rules of Article 81 and 82 of the 
EC Treaty. The Agreements mandated the bilateral Association Councils to 
implement the competition rules within three years. 
 
 Tóth (1998) gives a fascinating account of the effect of the Europe 
Agreements on the harmonisation of Hungarian competition law. He argues that for a 
number of reasons the provisions of the Europe Agreements regarding restrictive 
practices and abuse of dominant positions that affect trade between the candidate 
country and the EU must be seen as “soft law”. Not even the implementing rules can 
be seen as giving direct effect of the competition article of the Europe Agreements, 
since they foresee that both competition authorities should proceed on the basis of 
their own substantive legislation. Tóth further argues that a candidate country has an 
obligation to harmonise competition rules while Member States are free to choose a 
different legislation. This implies that a candidate country might in theory choose to 
re-optimise its competition policy, once accession has occurred. Therefore, the 
                                                           
3 Commission (1999). For a comprehensive review, see Whish (2000). 
4 This rule thus applies to technology transfer moving in the opposite direction of that 
relating to the Notice on Subcontracting. The purpose of the rule is to allow "vertical 
agreements where the use, sale or resale of goods or services can be performed more 
effectively because IPRs are assigned to or transferred for use by the buyer". To 
qualify for the exemption, the IPR provisions must not contain restrictions of 
competition having the same object or effect as vertical restraints that are not 
exempted under the BER (Commission, 2000k, par. 30-31). 
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insistence on formal harmonization may not lead to effective ex-ante or ex-post 
competition compliance but exhaust itself in an approximation of legal texts. 
 
In sum, the candidate countries must copy Art. 81(1) and Art. 82 from the EC 
Treaty. However, they have also adopted some or all of the various block exemptions. 
This is the topic of the next section. 
 
 
3 Competition policy in the candidate countries 
 
The broad outlines of competition policy in the candidate countries are very – and 
increasingly – similar to EU law.5 In this sense at least there is little difference 
between the candidate countries in the fast lane to EU membership and those that are 
in for the long haul. The Baltic countries and Slovenia completed negotiations of the 
Competition Chapter in the second half of 2001. All others were still negotiating a 
few weeks before the Commission was scheduled to issue its final Progress Report, in 
October 2002, prior to the expected enlargement. 
 
All ten countries have a general prohibition on restrictive agreements, often 
verbatim following Art. 81(1), and apply the de minimis rule. They also all allow for 
exemptions from the prohibition of restrictive agreements, again mirroring the letter 
and the spirit of Art.81(3). Their laws provide for block exemptions much as in EU 
practice, although the lion’s share of harmonization in this area took place only in 
2001.  
 
Table 1.— Share of Vertical Restraints in Total Case Load 
Country Year Practice RA/TCL VR/TCL 
     
Bulgaria 1999-2000 Decisions 11/132 = 8%a 8/156=5%b 
Czech Republic 2000 Decisions 25/73 = 34% 20/73 = 27%
Estonia 1998-9 Investigations 17/190 = 9% ~ 0%
Hungary 2000 Decisions 18/144 = 12% 7/144 = 5%
Latvia 1999 Investigations 5/48 = 10% ~ 0%
Lithuania 2000 Decisions 6/63 = 9% 0/63 = 0%
Poland 2000 Decisions 16/297 = 5% <5%
Romania 1999 Decisions 312/472=66% 38/472=8%c 
Slovakia 2000 Decisions 10/201 = 5% <5%
Slovenia 2000 Decisions 9/51 = 18% ~ 0
   
Note: RA = restrictive agreements; TCL = total case load; VR = vertical restraints. 
a=1999;  b=2000; c=net of franchise agreements. 
Source: Antimonopoly Office (Slovakia, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001)), European 
Commission (2000a-j), Competition Council (Lithuania (1998, 1999, 2000, 2001)), 
Estonian Competition Board (1998, 1999, 2000, 2001), Office for Protection of 
                                                           
5 For references to candidate country competition laws, see final section of reference 
list as well as Musil (1996) on the Czech Republic; Tóth (1998) on Hungary; Virtanen 
(2000) on Lithuania; and Banas (1995) on Slovakia. Fornalczyk (2002) provides a 
general overview. 
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Competition (Czech Republic (2001)), Office of Economic Competition (Hungary 
(1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002)), plus interviews with competition officials. 
 
 Candidate competition law differs in terms of notification requirements. The 
rules are rather restrictive in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, 
and Romania. Here all agreements, including those covered by block exemptions, 
must be notified. Firms in Slovenia need to notify only agreements requiring 
individual exemptions. For firms in Latvia only agreements that go beyond what is 
exempted explicitly require notification. Poland and Slovakia have the most liberal 
regimes; in Slovakia, only mergers need to be notified, and in Poland firms are only 
expected to self-assess the agreements they are subject to in terms of the 
antimonopoly law. 
 
 Caseloads and case history are good indicators for the general level of activity 
of the competition authorities and for what the focus of their attention is. 
Unfortunately, information from candidate country sources, interviews, and the 
Commission often matches only approximately. Nonetheless a few interesting trends 
are evident. Until 2000, restrictive agreements accounted for anywhere between 8 and 
66 per cent of the total caseload. But in most countries there had been hardly any 
investigations of vertical restraints (see Table 1). 17 of the 20 Czech cases had to do 
with exclusive sale or purchasing, and with franchises. In Romania, of the 312 cases 
19 dealt with exclusive distribution, 17 with exclusive purchasing, 274 with 
franchising, and only two referred to technology and/or know-how transfer. In 
Slovakia, the relative prominence of restrictive agreements fell from 44 per cent to 16 
per cent in 1999-2000, and that of VRs from 35 per cent to 13 per cent. Most of these 
were multiple decisions concerning the retail outlets of the same five cosmetics 
distributors. Hence exclusive agreements of the type analysed in this paper were not 
prominent on the competition authorities’ agenda. 
 
This appears slowly to change, but not in all countries. For example, after 
provisions on vertical restraints were inserted into the Lithuanian competition law in 
2000, firms subsequently notified 30 VRs all of which qualified under the general 
exemption. Half of all restrictive agreements decided on by the Estonian and Latvian 
authorities in 2001 – which did not deal with any VRs in 2000 – concerned vertical 
restraints, but their absolute numbers were less than a handful and a mere fraction of 
the total load. Likewise in Slovenia, 4 out of 52 decisions concerned VRs in 2000. By 
contrast, in the Czech Republic decisions on horizontal and vertical (non-franchise) 
agreements in 2001 became more important relative to those relating to franchise 
agreements. 
 
By and large, the competition authorities in candidate countries have paid 
most attention to unfair competition, abuse of market dominance, and merger control. 
In mature market economies competition authorities devote more time and energy to 
horizontal than to vertical agreements, too. But the evidence reviewed above suggests 
that regulations of VRs are a legal proviso more than a standard feature of 
competition policy practice in the candidate countries. In terms of competition 
compliance, this could become a problem once the candidate countries join the EU. 
 
 In successive generations of Progress Reports reviewing the candidate 
countries’ readiness for EU accession, the Commission made little use of this 
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information (e.g. Commission 2000a-j, 2001a-j). It confirmed that in all candidate 
countries, legislation was largely (fully in the case of a few countries) in line with the 
acquis although further progress was necessary in view of developments in the acquis 
with respect to vertical restraints. The Commission identified the application and 
enforcement of rules as the principal challenge for competition policy in the candidate 
countries and admonished the competition authorities to concentrate on serious 
breaches of the law instead of on what it interpreted as often marginal infringements 
that were being investigated. But our research shows that a harmonised legal 
apparatus plus a competent and vigilant competition authority by themselves do not 
make for competitive markets.6 Section 4 provides evidence for this claim. 
 
4 Subcontractor agreements in the car industry in the candidate countries 
 
In 1999-2000, we conducted a survey of 413 car component suppliers' exposure to or 
use of vertical agreements and technology transfer in Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. We asked what type of exclusivity they 
faced in their contracts, if any: if customers requested exclusivity of the respondent 
firm (ECR); whether they requested exclusivity of their customer (ERC); whether 
suppliers requested exclusivity of the respondent firm (ESR); and whether they 
requested exclusivity of their supplier (ERS). We also asked if they received 
technology from their customer (TTC) and whether they transferred technology to 
their own supplier (TTS). Table 2 summarizes the findings on technology transfer and 
use of exclusivity. 
 
Table 2. – Summary of evidence on exclusive agreements and technology transfer 
 Number of different types of exclusive agreements  
Technology transfer 0 1 2 3 4 TOTAL
 0 56 38 9 10 3 116
 1 75 45 17 7 3 147
 2 80 32 18 13 5 148
 TOTAL 211 115 44 30 11 411
Note: Number of observations reduced from 413 to 411 due to two missing values. 
 
The table shows that 28 per cent (116 of 411) of the firms did not receive 
technology from their customer and did not transfer technology to their supplier. Yet 
out of these 116 firms, only slightly less than half (56) did not engage in exclusivity at 
all. One third (38) had experience with exactly one kind of exclusive agreements 
                                                           
6 Tóth (1998, p. 364), for example, is intrigued by the fact that although the new 
Hungarian Competition Act called for notification, the Hungarian Competition 
Authority “did not have to work itself into the ground by responding to hundreds of 
notifications. Notwithstanding a few examples, statistics show that things stand now 
as if the law on vertical restraints had not changed at all. The general ban on vertical 
competition restrictions neither provoked hostile reactions from the business sphere, 
nor gave rise to a mass of notifications seeking negative clearance or exemption.” 
Tóth speculates whether this is due to Hungarian firms being unaware of the new 
rules or because Hungarian firms do not engage in vertical restraints. 
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while 19 per cent (9+10+3) did with two or more. There is no evident relationship 
between the extent of technology transfer and the use of exclusivity. Independently of 
whether the respondent firm is not at all involved in technology transfer, party to one 
kind only (TTC or TTS), or to two kinds (TTC and TTS), roughly half the firms 
experience no exclusive agreements, 30 per cent exactly one kind of exclusivity, and 
20 per cent two or more kinds. 
 
 There are country differences. Romanian firms are especially likely to receive 
and transfer technology with no strings attached (no exclusive agreements). More than 
half of our Romanian firms both receive technology from their customers and transfer 
it to their suppliers without facing any exclusive agreements. At the other extreme, 
Hungarian and Polish firms are more likely to face exclusive agreements without any 
technology transfer than are firms in the other four countries. Polish and Czech firms 
are most likely to meet exclusivity, but in the Czech cases it is more easily defended 
by the simultaneous occurrence of technology transfer. However, Planavova-
Latanowicz and Harding (1999) find that general awareness of competition policy is 
higher in Poland than in the Czech Republic. What matters is perhaps the Polish law 
providing for self-assessments, whereas notification is required in the other countries. 
  
A simple efficiency hypothesis justifying use of exclusivity could be as 
follows: A customer that transfers technology (TTC) requests exclusivity (ECR) from 
the receiver of technology in order to protect the transfer. This would be in 
accordance with the thinking behind the legal framework outlined in Section 2. Table 
3 shows that 39 per cent of the firms that did not receive technology from their 
customers nonetheless faced requests of exclusivity from them. At the same time, 65 
per cent of the firms that received technology from their customers had no such 
demands placed on them. This shows that the simple hypothesis is only true for at 
most 45 per cent of the sample. For the remaining cases, a more complicated 
explanation for technology transfer or use of exclusivity is called for. This is where 
our case material fits in (see Sections 4.1-3). 
 
Table 3. – Use of ECR and TTC among the firms 
 Exclusivity requested by customer? 
TT from customer? No Yes TOTAL
No 99 62 161
Yes 162 88 250
 
 
TOTAL 261 150 411
Note: Number of observations reduced from 413 to 411 due to two missing values. 
 
 Again, results differ across countries. On average, 15 per cent of the firms face 
ECR restraints without receiving technology from their customer, but Polish and 
Hungarian firms are more likely to experience this (20 per cent) than Romanian (4 per 
cent) or Slovakian firms (7 per cent). 
  
Upstream, a justification for exclusivity would read as follows. To protect TT, 
a respondent firm that transfers technology to a supplier (TTS) requests that this 
supplier not sell the products manufactured with this technology to the competitors of 
the respondent (ERS). This would again be in line with the thinking behind rules 
discussed in Section 2. Table 4 shows that a little less that half of the firms transfer 
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technology to their suppliers, and of these only nine per cent protect their technology 
transfer using exclusive agreements. Six per cent of the firms request exclusivity of 
their suppliers although no technology transfer has taken place. The simple hypothesis 
only appears to be true for at most 55 per cent of the cases, asking for a more 
complicated case analysis. 
 
Table 4.—Use of ERS and TTS among the firms 
 Exclusivity requested from supplier? 
TT to supplier? No Yes TOTAL
 No 207 13 220
 Yes 175 18 193
 TOTAL 382 31 413
 
This time, Polish and Hungarian firms are twice as likely to request exclusivity 
without transferring technology than the average firm. And this never happens in 
Romania or Slovakia and only rarely in the Czech Republic. 
 
To throw light on the many situations where these two simple efficiency 
hypotheses about the relationship between vertical restraints and technology transfer 
do not hold, we contacted firms that had reported to use or to be exposed to exclusive 
agreements in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. During the 
summer of 2000, we assembled more than 30 case studies. Semi-structured interviews 
in the four countries were held primarily in the local language. They focused on 
• the way in which technology transfer and vertical restraints are related; 
• how firms bargain about exclusive agreements and how their bargaining position 
is determined; 
• the firm's knowledge of competition policy at the domestic and EU level. 
 
The interviewed firms broadly fall into three categories. In the first group, firms 
impose VRs to protect TT, thus confirming the hypotheses. In the second group, firms 
transfer technology to their supplier. This requires the recipient firm to undertake 
relationship-specific investment to be able to use the transferred technology. To 
ensure itself against hold-up by the transferring firm, the supplier then imposes 
exclusivity on the transferring firm. Thus, we experience TTS and ESR at the same 
time, but this is again consistent with traditional economic efficiency explanations  
(Williamson, 1985, Klein et al., 1978). 
 
In the third group, firms do not transfer technology but demand exclusivity all the 
same. We focus on these potentially problematic cases in Sections 4.2-3 below. First 
we briefly discuss the cases that fit our hypotheses. 
 
4.1 Vertical restraints with technology transfer 
 
A Czech producer of a "very complex and technologically intensive product" that 
received technology from a final assembler supports our hypothesis that exclusivity 
may be used to protect intellectual property rights:  
 
"… we cannot use the transferred technology to produce products for any 
other firm except the one which gave us the technology – and the same holds 
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for our suppliers. The problem is that the current patent law is not sufficient to 
protect the transferred technology." 
 
The firm extends the same exclusivity clause to its own suppliers. Thus it 
seems that firms transfer not only technology upstream, but also exclusive 
agreements. This firm did not bargain about the exclusivity terms but did renegotiate 
the penalty from breaking it. The firm claims to be aware of national and EU rules on 
vertical restrictions but does not think it violates them. For this reason it did not notify 
any authorities about the VR although in our reading of the Czech rules on 
notification it would have to do so (see Section 3). However, the firm added, "even if 
we would feel like [we were] violating some regulation rules, we would never do it 
[notify], because we would be immediately out of business." 
 
 Another Czech producer of a "complex and technologically intensive product" 
agreed with its customers that it would not sell to their competitors. In exchange the 
manufacturer receives technology and finds that this technology helps improve both 
product and processes. The technology could not have been acquired on the open 
market "because the technology is very special." In addition, the firm negotiated that 
its customers do not buy rivals' products (i.e. ERC). Thus the exclusivity seems to be 
reciprocal in this case. The firm invested in own research capacity. Thus, the ECR can 
be perceived as protecting technology transfer, and the ERC a relation-specific 
investment. This company is familiar with rules regarding vertical restraints but did 
not find it necessary to notify the authorities. 
 
4.2 Vertical restraints without technology transfer: de minimis? 
 
A small Hungarian producer of brake hoses, a very simple product that is easily 
copied from original equipment samples or acquired on the market, entered a contract 
with a Danish trading company. The latter requested the Hungarian firm not to sell 
outside Hungary except through the Danish company, and that they not be present at 
foreign trade fairs. The business with the Danish firm amounted to roughly 30 per 
cent of their total turnover and as such was something the Hungarian firm could not 
afford to lose. There was no technology transfer in the sense of the subcontractor 
notice. The Danish firm would simply send the Hungarian firm original equipment 
samples and request it to produce small runs of these products for the European 
aftermarket. The Hungarian company was not familiar with competition rules 
concerning vertical restraints and did not consider notifying competition authorities 
about the exclusivity, although it found the agreement strange. In fact, it probably did 
not have to notify as it would benefit from the de minimis rule. Its annual sales are 
about USD 500,000 which is likely less than one per cent of total turnover in the 
(after-)market for brake hoses.  
 
4.3 Vertical restraints without technology transfer 
 
A Hungarian producer of components for buses and lorries entered an 
agreement with a customer that has a very large market share. After the contract for 
delivery had been signed, the customer wrote to the producer: "We inform you of the 
fact that the supplied product is our own product and you are not allowed to sell it but 
through us." The producer opines that this product cannot be protected as it is 
generally available on the world market and it is not covered by a patent. The 
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customer, however, invokes intellectual property rights. This is an interesting case in 
which the customer could claim (rightly or wrongly) that the agreement can be 
interpreted positively in terms of the subcontractor notice while the producer would 
contend that it cannot. The companies (both Hungarian) did not notify the competition 
authority about the agreement.  
 
A Slovenian producer of washers is subject to a vertical restraint by a 
Romanian customer. In general these restraints appear in cases “where the customer is 
important enough” for the firm. Interestingly the company has a fairly advanced (if 
erroneous) view on the nature of these restraints: 
 
"[The] vertical restraints are in principle not formalised in some formal 
agreements but are informal as a kind of gentlemens' agreements. This is eased 
by the fact that [the Company's] sales are relatively concentrated on a smaller 
number of customers with whom the company has long established business 
relations. Although the gentlemens' agreements make the practical imposition 
of restraints less sure, on the other hand it eliminates any potential problems of 
being accused of using restrictive business practices." 
 
In sum, many firms use or face exclusivity in vertical contracts. In some cases 
this is associated with technology transfer. Yet in many cases TT cannot explain the 
use of exclusivity. This represents a challenge for competition policy in an enlarged 
Europe.  
 
 
5 Harmonisation and compliance 
 
The literature on the criminology of the corporation categorizes firms in three 
types of agents according to their motive for not complying with legislation (Frazer, 
1995, p. 58). They may be ‘amoral calculators’ that rationally decide to break the law 
because fines are low or the probability of detection is small; ‘incompetent 
organizations’ that are poorly managed or informed about the legislation; or ‘political 
citizens’ that view the legal rules as being unfair, unjust or unreasonable. A mixture of 
the three is obviously possible. Our case studies identified a high fraction of 
‘incompetent organizations’, relatively many ‘amoral calculators’ and a fair number 
of ‘political citizens’. 
 
Our analysis illustrates a number of insights. First, violations of EU and 
candidate country competition rules on vertical restraints do take place. Our survey 
suggests that a substantial number of exclusive agreements are not easily defended on 
efficiency grounds. Indeed, technology transfer explains at most half of VRs at 
different stages of the supply chain in our sample. We do not imply that all of these 
would be deemed illegal if they were investigated. They might fall below the 
threshold of de minimis rules or be innocent for reasons that the statistics do no reveal. 
Furthermore, it may well be that the car component industry is not representative for 
the business environment as a whole. However, the case studies clearly show that not 
all are innocent. 
 
Second, they go undetected. Whether this is rare or frequent is anyone’s guess. 
If no-one is aware of these infringements, it obviously becomes rational for the firms 
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involved not to care about the competition rules regarding vertical restraints. 
Fingleton et al. (1996, Chap. 6) reported that competition authorities in Central 
Europe were swamped by complaints about unfair bargains in contract relationships. 
We do not suggest that it would be sensible to re-instate such a regime. But to the 
extent that the competition authorities of the candidate countries wish to take anti-
competitive effects of vertical restraints seriously, their notification provisions make a 
lot of sense. Unlike with abuse of dominance, merger control, and state aid, effective 
supervision of vertical restraints is not going to work if it relies exclusively on 
monitoring ex officio and investigations of complaints. In other words, a minimum of 
cooperation from market participants is required. It may be that the European Union 
can make do without notification of such agreements because firms in the EU have a 
long experience based on the Commission’s and the Court’s practice of determining 
notified cases. But many firms in the candidate countries clearly lack this experience. 
 
Third, firms in Central Europe are either ignorant or suspicious of competition 
law, at least as far as vertical restraints are concerned. Ignorant, because they often 
simply do not know what the rules are. And suspicious, because our interviews 
indicate that firms regard notification – let alone complaints – much like a gang of 
street smarts views ratting to the police. 
 
 Our analyses showed that in order to ensure compliance the Commission and 
the prospective new members must now move on to more practical tasks: 
 
1) They must make companies understand that competition authorities are not 
their enemies, but that they may also be an ally when faced with anti-
competitive vertical restraints. This amounts to convincing ‘political citizens’ 
that competition policy is an essential part of free markets. It is especially 
important to allay the fear that ‘if I talk to competition authorities, I’ll be out 
of business’, through high-profile trial cases and a proper system to ensure the  
paying of damages. 
2) They must target ‘incompetent organizations’ by explaining the rules in clear 
language and reach out beyond big-city business associations and antitrust 
lawyers. 
3) They must target ‘amoral calculators’ by ensuring proper methods of 
revelation and by sufficient penalties to make non-compliance a significant 
expected cost. Reinforcing and keeping the present notification system in 
place for a number of years would support this endeavour. 
 12
6 References 
 
Antimonopoly Office (Slovakia), 1997-2001, Annual Report 1996-2001, 
www.antimon.gov.sk/default_a.htm. 
 
Banas, Milan, 1995, "The New Anti-monopoly Law in Slovakia", European 
Competition Law Review 16(7): 441-445. 
 
Competition Council (Lithuania), 1998-2002, Annual Report 1997-2001, 
www.konkuren.lt/english/annual/. 
 
Dutz, Mark A. and Maria Vagliasindi, 2000, “Competition Policy Implementation in 
Transition Economies: An Empirical Assessment”, European Economic Review 44: 
762-772. 
 
Estonian Competition Board, 1998-2002, Annual Report 1997-2001, 
www.konkurentsiamet.ee/gb/ar/. 
 
European Commission, 1978, “Commission Notice of 18.12.1978 concerning its 
assessment of certain subcontracting agreements in relation to Article 85(1) of the 
EEC Treaty”, Official Journal C1, 3.1.1979. 
 
_______, 1996, “Commission Regulation (EC) 240/96 of 31 January 1996 on the 
application of Article 81(3) of the treaty to certain categories of technology transfer”, 
Official Journal L31, 09.02.1996: 2-13. 
 
_______, 1999, “Commission Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 
on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements 
and concerted practices”, Official Journal L336, 29/12/1999: 21-25. 
 
_______, 2000a (2001a), "2000 (2001) Regular Report from the Commission on 
Bulgaria’s Progress towards Accession," 8 November (13 November), Brussels. 
 
_______, 2000b (2001b) "2000 (2001) Regular Report from the Commission on the 
Czech Republic’s Progress towards Accession," 8 November (13 November), 
Brussels. 
 
_______, 2000c (2001c), "2000 (2001) Regular Report from the Commission on 
Estonia’s Progress towards Accession," 8 November (13 November), Brussels. 
 
_______, 2000d (2001d), "2000 (2001) Regular Report from the Commission on 
Hungary’s Progress towards Accession," 8 November (13 November), Brussels. 
 
_______, 2000e (2001e), "2000 (2001) Regular Report from the Commission on 
Latvia’s Progress towards Accession," 8 November (13 November), Brussels. 
 
_______, 2000f (2001f), "2000 (2001) Regular Report from the Commission on 
Lithuania’s Progress towards Accession," 8 November (13 November), Brussels. 
 
 13
_______, 2000g (2001g), "2000 (2001) Regular Report from the Commission on 
Poland’s Progress towards Accession," 8 November (13 November), Brussels. 
 
_______, 2000h (2001h), "2000 (2001) Regular Report from the Commission on 
Romania’s Progress towards Accession," 8 November (13 November), Brussels. 
 
_______, 2000i (2001i), "2000 (2001) Regular Report from the Commission on 
Slovakia’s Progress towards Accession," 8 November (13 November), Brussels. 
 
_______, 2000j (2001j), "2000 (2001) Regular Report from the Commission on 
Slovenia’s Progress towards Accession," 8 November (13 November), Brussels. 
 
_______, 2000k “Commission Notice: Guidelines on Vertical Restraints,” Official 
Journal C291: 1-44. 
 
Fejø, Jens, 1997, EU-konkurrenceret, 2nd ed., Copenhagen: Jurist- og 
Økonomforbundets Forlag. 
 
Fingleton, John, Eleanor Fox, Damien Neven and Paul Seabright, 1996, Competition 
Policy and the Transformation of Central Europe, London: CEPR. 
 
Fornalczyk, Anna. 2002. The Enforcement of Competition Policy in the Candidate 
Countries. Intereconomics (January/February): 52-8. 
 
Frazer, Tim (1995) “Monpoly, Prohibition and Deterrence”, Modern Law Review 
58(6): 846-859. 
 
Hoekman, Bernard and Simeon Djankov, 2000, "Competition Law in Post-Central-
Planning Bulgaria", The Antitrust Bulletin, 227-248. 
 
Klein, B.; R. Crawford and A. Alchian, 1978, "Vertical Integration, Appropriable 
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process", Journal of Law and Economics 
21(2): 297-326. 
 
Korah, Valentine (1996) Technology Transfer Agreements and the EC Competition 
Rules, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Musil, Ales, 1996, "Protection of Economic Competition in the Czech Republic", 
European Competition Law Review 17(8): 476-479. 
 
Office of Economic Competition (Hungary), 1998-2002, Annual Report 1996/97-
2001, www.gvh.hu/angol/. 
 
Planavova-Latanowicz, Jana and Christopher Harding, 1999, "The Control of 
Concentrations in the Czech Republic and Poland", European Competition Law 
Review 20(5): 265-274. 
 
Robertson, Aidan, 1996, "Technology Transfer Agreements: An Overview of how 
Regulation 240/96 Changes the Law", European Competition Law Review 17(3): 157-
162. 
 14
 
Tóth, Tihamér, 1998, "Competition Law in Hungary: Harmonisation Towards E.U. 
Membership", European Competition Law Review 19(6): 358-369. 
 
Van Bael, Ivo and Jean-Francois Bellis, 1987, Competition Law of the EEC, Bicester: 
CCH Editions 
 
Van Den Bossche, A.M., 1997, "The International Dimension of E.C. Competition 
Law: The Case of the Europe Agreement", European Competition Law Review 18(1): 
24-37. 
 
Virtanen, Dalia, 2000, "The New Competition Act in Lithuania" European 
Competition Law Review 21(1): 30-36. 
 
Whish, Richard, 2000, “Regulation 2790/99: The Commission’s ‘New Style’ Block 
Exemption for Vertical Agreements,” Common Market Law Review 37: 887-924. 
 
Williamson, Oliver, 1985, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: Free 
Press. 
 
 
6.1 Candidate country competition legislation 
 
Bulgaria: “Law on the Protection of Competition”, www.cpc.bg/englaw.htm. 
 
Czech Republic: “Act on the Protection of Economic Competition”, 
www.compet.cz/Zakony/zakonHseng.htm. 
 
Estonia: “Competition Act”, www.konkurentsiamet.ee/gb/eng-law.rtf. 
 
Hungary: “Act on Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices”, 
www.gvh.hu/angol/ineto6aa.htm. 
 
Latvia: not available on the web. 
 
Lithuania: “Law on Competition”, www.konkuren.lt/english/antitrust/legal.htm. 
 
Poland: not available on the web. 
 
Romania: “Competition Law”, www.oficiulconcurentei.ro/legea2_english.htm. 
 
Slovakia: “Act on Protection of Economic Competition”, 
www.antimon.gov.sk/default_a.htm. 
 
Slovenia: “Prevention of the Restriction of Competition Act”, 
www.sigov.si/uvk/ang/2legal/1basis.html. 
